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Chapter 6
Social dialogue during the economic crisis:  
the survival of collective bargaining in the 
manufacturing sector in Romania 
Aurora Trif1
1.  Reform of joint regulation and labour market policy
1.1  Introduction
In their seminal book on the models of eastern European capitalism, 
Bohle and Greskovits (2012) argue that Romania has a special type 
of neoliberal society with weak state institutions, a high degree of 
centralisation and collective bargaining coverage and relatively high 
mobilisation power on the part of the trade unions. Before the 2008 
crisis, Romania had a comprehensive system of industrial relations with 
widespread collective bargaining at national, sectoral and establishment 
levels. The legal system supported the development of bipartite and 
tripartite consultation and negotiation between trade unions, employers 
and the government (Trif 2010). However, this system was radically 
altered by the government after the crisis, despite opposition from trade 
unions and the largest employers’ associations (Ciutacu 2012). The legal 
changes led to the implosion of trade unions’ fundamental rights to 
bargain collectively, to form trade unions and to take industrial action. 
As a result, cross-sectoral collective agreements ceased to exist and very 
few multi-employer collective agreements were concluded after the new 
labour code was adopted in 2011. The crisis was used as a pretext by 
the centre-right government to reform the industrial relations system, 
with the support of the ‘Troika’, comprising the European Union (EU), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB). 
1. This chapter is based on the findings of the research  project number VS/2013/0409 
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1.2  Collective bargaining before the 2008 crisis
Romania had relatively protectionist labour legislation with high 
centralisation and collective bargaining coverage before 2008 (Bohle 
and Greskovits 2012; Trif 2008). The Romanian legal system has a 
strong French influence, being broadly based on the Napoleonic Code. 
Post-1989 legislation entitled the social partners to bargain collectively 
and gave unions the right to strike (Hayter et al. 2013). Collective 
agreements could be concluded at national, industry (or other sub-
divisions) and company levels. Comparable only to Slovenia among 
the new EU member states, there was automatic extension of collective 
agreements to cover all employees in the bargaining unit. In Romania, 
all employees were covered by a cross-sectoral national agreement 
before the 2008 crisis. Additionally, employees were covered at industry 
level by collective agreements in 20 out of the 32 branches eligible 
for collective bargaining. Collective agreements existed in the main 
manufacturing sectors, namely extractive industry, the metal industry, 
the white goods industry, the automobile industry, the food industry, 
the textile industry and the wood industry (Preda 2006: 13). Collective 
agreements concluded at national and sectoral levels set the minimum 
terms and conditions of employment. Thus, they were used as minimum 
standards for the negotiation of collective agreements at company level 
in unionised companies. Nevertheless, it was difficult to enforce the 
provisions of collective agreements (and the statutory labour legislation), 
particularly for the lowest paid employees (Trif 2008).
Romanian law requires employers to initiate collective bargaining 
annually in any company with more than 20 employees (Hayter et al. 
2013). In large unionised companies, wages, social benefits, holidays 
and working conditions are generally negotiated between trade unions, 
employers and, sometimes, the state (Trif 2008). In most non-unionised 
companies, employers unilaterally imposed terms and conditions. 
In contrast to Slovenia and Slovakia, in Romania the company was 
the most important level for establishing the terms and conditions of 
employment, even before the crisis (Carley et al. 2007). 
The EU accession process led to legislative change that affected collective 
bargaining. In order to harmonise Labour Code provisions with the 
EU social acquis, the restrictions on concluding individual fixed-term 
employment contracts were relaxed in countries that had relatively 
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protectionist labour legislation, such as Romania and Slovenia (Carley 
et al. 2007). However, when the Council of Foreign Investors tried to 
remove the legal obligation on employers to bargain with trade unions 
or employee representatives during the 2005 Labour Code revision, 
Romanian trade union officials managed to preserve the collective 
bargaining mechanism with the support of the European Trade Union 
Congress and the International Labour Organization (Trif 2008). 
Although the formal Romanian labour market regulation before 2008 
was considered protectionist, particularly by foreign investors, in 
practice, the issues with the enforcement of the labour legislation and 
collective agreements made it fairly flexible (Bohle and Greskovits 
2012). Furthermore, low wages were one of the key factors that led to 
massive labour migration before (and after) the crisis and low labour 
force participation (Stoiciu 2012; Trif 2014). Thus, labour market 
regulations were not perceived as hindering Romania’s competitiveness. 
Furthermore, labour market regulations could have been used to address 
the labour market issues of massive emigration and low labour force 
participation (Stoiciu 2012; Trif 2013).
Trade unions before the 2008 crisis
After 1989, the organisation and functioning of trade unions were 
regulated primarily by the Constitution, the Labour Code and the Law 
on Trade Unions. The law allowed a minimum of 15 employees to form a 
union. Two unions from the same industry can form a union federation if 
their combined membership is at least 60, and two federations can form 
a confederation. This legal framework contributed to the development of 
a decentralised and fragmented trade union movement. 
Trade union fragmentation is common in central and eastern Europe, 
particularly due to the division between the old reformed unions and 
newly established organisations. In Romania, however, the reformed 
and the largest new union organisations merged in 1993 to create the 
largest confederation, the National Free Trade Union Confederation of 
Romania – Fratia (CNSRL-Fratia). There are four additional nationally 
representative union confederations in Romania: the National Trade 
Union Block (BNS); the National Democratic Trade Union Confederation 
of Romania (created in 1994 as result of a split from CNSRL-Fratia); 
the National Trade Union Confederation Cartel Alfa; and Meridian. 
Despite a widely publicised proposed merger of four of these five 
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confederations in February 2007, CNSRL-Fratia, BNS and Meridian 
only formed a loose alliance and maintained their independent status. 
Similar to all central and eastern European countries, the reformed 
union remained the strongest organisation after 1990. Most Romanian 
union confederations (except Meridian) are members of the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).
The period of transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-
based economy has been very difficult for trade unions. They had to 
protect workers’ interests during the transition, but also to support 
the move towards a more efficient economic system that would 
(hopefully) improve working conditions in the long term. By and large, 
Romanian unions did not obstruct the transformation process, although 
restructuring led to a massive decline in their membership. However, 
unlike the Polish Solidarity union they did not support shock therapy 
reform. Trade union density in Romania fell from 90 per cent at the 
beginning of the 1990s to around 35 per cent in 2006 but was still twice 
as high as in Poland (Trif 2008). Romanian and Slovenian trade unions 
were amongst the strongest in central and eastern Europe in terms of 
union density and influence over labour legislation before the crisis 
(Carley et al. 2007).
The manufacturing sector had the highest trade union density in 
Romania, although unions were fairly fragmented. In 2002, trade 
union density in heavy industry was over 75 per cent, while in the food 
and textile sectors it was around 50 per cent (Preda 2006: 13–15). The 
highest union density was in the metal industry (83 per cent). Ten 
union federations were operating in the metal sector, five of which were 
representative at the sectoral level (Preda 2006: 44). In the chemical 
sector, there were five union federations and 76 per cent union density 
in 2002. Eight union federations operated in the textile industry and 
four in the food, beverage and tobacco sector. Nevertheless, in each 
manufacturing branch the representative unions cooperated regularly 
to negotiate collective agreements, which covered all employees in the 
sector before the crisis.
Employers’ associations before the crisis
In most new EU member states, employers’ associations had a limited 
role in the development of industrial relations after 1989 compared with 
trade unions. The lack of experience and the slow pace of privatisation 
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were the main factors that resulted in the very weak consolidation of 
Romanian employers’ associations. Additionally, foreign investors were 
not willing to join such associations. They preferred to join a trade 
association called the Council of Foreign Investors (Chivu 2005).
The fragmentation of employers’ associations is common in the new 
member states (Kohl and Platzer 2004), but Romanian associations 
are amongst the most divided in the region. The number of nationally 
representative employers’ associations increased from five prior to 2001 
to 13 by 2008. A first attempt to merge the five largest confederations 
was made in December 1995 with support from the International 
Organization of Employers. An agreement to form Patronatul Roman 
was signed but conflict between the divergent interests of private and 
state-owned enterprises led to separation in 1996. In 1999, there was 
a second attempt to unify employers’ organisations in an Employers’ 
Confederation of Romania but this disbanded in 2003.
In 2004, the two largest member organisations of the former Employers’ 
Confederation of Romania, together with four other employers’ associa-
tions, established an umbrella organisation, the Alliance of Employers’ 
Confederations of Romania, covering primarily large domestically owned 
companies. By May 2006, seven employers’ confederations were mem-
bers of this organisation, with four others announcing their intention to 
create a new alliance (Chivu 2007). The Alliance of Employers’ Confed-
erations of Romania was established primarily to represent members’ 
interests at the international level, particularly in EU institutions. More-
over, the merger of these fragmented associations was a pre-condition 
for membership of the European employers’ confederation, Business Eu-
rope. Employers started to combine their strength at the national level 
but there were still 13 nationally representative employers’ associations 
in 2008, as the members of the umbrella organisations retained their 
representative status. In 2007, all 13 employers’ associations signed the 
last cross-sectoral collective agreement valid from 2007 to 2010. 
Sectoral employers’ associations also remained fragmented. Before the 
crisis, there were 15 employers’ associations in the food, beverage and 
tobacco sector, six employers’ associations in the chemical sector and 
two in the metal industry (Preda 2006). Similar to union federations, 
the employers’ federations in the manufacturing sectors managed to 
cooperate during the process of negotiating sectoral collective agreements. 
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1.3  The crisis and social partners’ responses to it
Socio-economic developments since the crisis
The international financial crisis severely affected economic and social 
developments in Romania after 2008. GDP fell by 6.6 per cent in 2009, 
followed by a further reduction of 1.6 per cent in 2010, indicating a more 
severe economic downturn than in Bulgaria, which had a similar level of 
economic growth before the crisis, and the EU average (Eurostat 2014). 
The construction sector was the worst affected, dropping 14 per cent as a 
percentage of GDP in 2009, followed by agriculture (–7.8 per cent) and 
services (–5.9 per cent) (Zaman and Georgescu 2009: 618). After 2008, 
the average wage increases were below the level of inflation (Trif 2013). 
Also, wage earnings in Romania are among the lowest in the EU (Hayter 
et al. 2013), which indicates that the trade unions did not manage to 
safeguard employees’ purchasing power.
Nevertheless, Romania has one of the lowest unemployment rates in 
the EU. Although the crisis led to massive lay-offs in manufacturing, 
construction, retail and the public sector (Stoiciu 2012: 2), unemployment 
has increased by less than 2 per cent since 2008 to a high of 7.5 per 
cent in 2013 (Eurostat 2014). While the government took measures to 
encourage employment, such as exempting companies from paying tax 
on reinvested profit and social security contributions for six months 
if they hired unemployed people (Stoiciu 2012: 2), it appears that the 
main reason for the low unemployment rate is the fact that Romanian 
workers used individual ‘exit’ either into the informal economy or 
by emigrating abroad (Stan and Erne 2014). The size of the informal 
economy increased from around 22 per cent in 2007 to 29 per cent in 
2012 (European Commission 2013: 5). Eurobarometer data from 2007 
indicate that the main reason for working in the informal economy is 
the low wages in regular businesses. These data also show that only 27 
per cent of the Romanian population trust trade unions, which suggests 
that the majority of workers do not believe that unions can improve their 
working conditions.
Although reliable statistics on emigration since 2008 are not available, 
trade union officials have suggested that wage cuts in the public sector 
in 2009 and 2010 boosted the emigration of public sector employees. A 
senior official interviewed in 2013 indicated that around 2,700 doctors 
have emigrated every year in recent years and their number increased 
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by 400 in 2011, after the implementation of the austerity measures. 
The total number of Romanian emigrants from 1990 to 2012 is 2.4 
million (Institutul National de Statistica 2014: 9). Unlike in the other 
EU countries severely affected by the crisis, such as Greece and Spain, 
unemployment and labour market regulation have not been a major 
issue during the crisis or considered a cause of the crisis in Romania.
There are three sets of interrelated causes of the economic downturn 
in Romania. First, despite the limited proportion of toxic assets in its 
banking system, Romania has been exposed to the adverse effects of the 
global financial crisis primarily due to its openness to foreign capital (Ban 
2014). For instance, foreign stakeholders account for over 85 per cent of 
total banking assets (Trif 2013). The second set of factors is related to 
the reduction of external and internal demand for goods and services. 
Romanian exports to the EU shrank by 25 per cent in 2009 (Trif 2013). The 
manufacturing sector was among the first affected by the crisis, suffering 
a 7.7 per cent contraction in the last quarter of 2008, due to a decline in 
domestic and external demand (Constantin et al. 2011: 7). Wage cuts for 
many workers, coupled with declining remittances from abroad, reduced 
private consumption by 9.2 per cent (Constantin et al. 2011). The third 
set of factors is related to the economic weaknesses and imbalances that 
existed before 2008 (Ban 2014). Economic growth before 2008 was based 
primarily on the consumption of imported goods and real estate sales. 
Despite economic growth between 2000 and 2008 (approximately 6 per 
cent per annum on average), the budget deficit increased continuously, 
reaching 9 per cent of GDP in 2009 (Stoiciu 2012: 2). 
In order to deal with the budget deficit, Romania borrowed 20 billion 
euros from the Troika in 2010. Additionally, Romania signed a 
Precautionary Agreement with the IMF in 2011. The conditions set by 
the two international agreements for financial assistance had a great 
influence on the way in which Romanian governments responded to the 
crisis (Hayter et al. 2013; Trif 2013). 
Government response to crisis: austerity measures and structural reforms
A combination of international pressure from the Troika, the ideology 
of the centre-right coalition and lobbying by foreign investors led to 
two main sets of government response to the 2008 crisis: (i) ‘austerity’ 
measures aimed at reducing public debt and (ii) structural reforms 
aimed at addressing macroeconomic imbalances through structural 
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reforms (Ban 2014; Stoiciu 2012). From 2009, the government started 
to introduce fiscal consolidation measures, seeking to reduce the budget 
deficit by reducing the wage bill for public sector employees, cutting 
pensions and limiting welfare benefits (Stoiciu 2012; Ministry of Public 
Finance 2014). In 2009, a new public wage law was introduced by 
the government (as part of their negotiations with the Troika) which 
reduced public wages (Hayter et al. 2013). Apart from changing wage 
grids by tying all public sector employees to a wage scale defined in 
terms multiples of a base wage of 700 RON (165 euros), the provisions 
of the new law obliged the management of public institutions to reduce 
personnel expenditure by 15 per cent in 2009. This forced employees to 
take ten days of unpaid leave. In addition, pensioners were forbidden 
to obtain additional income on top of their pensions by working in paid 
employment. 
In 2010, the centre-right coalition introduced some of the most restric-
tive austerity measures in the EU, cutting the wages of public sector em-
ployees by 25 per cent, reducing numerous social benefits by 15 per cent 
and increasing VAT from 19 per cent to 25 per cent (Trif 2010). These 
measures (which were part of the conditions attached to the Troika’s fi-
nancial assistance) reduced the budget deficit from 9 per cent of GDP in 
2009 to 3 per cent of GDP in 2012 (Eurostat 2014). They helped the gov-
ernment to achieve financial consolidation, but the budget savings were 
made at the expense of living standards (Hayter et al. 2013).
Since 2011, Romanian governments have focused on structural reforms, 
such as ‘restructuring’ the public sector – in other words, cutting 
jobs and privatising public hospitals and public companies – and the 
‘flexibilisation’ of the labour market and industrial relations institutions 
(Ban 2014; Ministry of Public Finance 2014). Labour market reforms 
were considered important for addressing the issues of low labour force 
participation and migration (Romania has one of the lowest labour force 
participation levels in the EU and around a third of the active labour 
force has immigrated since 1990s) (Stoiciu 2012). Although labour 
market ‘rigidities’ are not considered a cause of the recession in Romania 
(Ban 2014), the Troika pushed for a radical decentralisation of collective 
bargaining and more restrictive criteria for extending collective 
bargaining (Schulten and Müller 2013: 6). In 2011, the centre-right 
government took the opportunity to dismantle the existing collective 
bargaining institutions and reduce the trade unions’ role and influence 
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by means of legal changes (see Appendix). It unilaterally introduced a 
new Social Dialogue Act, which abolished all the previous laws governing 
employees’ collective rights (Trif 2013; see further discussion of the 
effects of the Social Dialogue Act in Section 4). 
The government also adopted a new Labour Code in 2011, which 
primarily affected individual employee rights (Stoiciu 2012). First, the 
probation period was extended from 30 to 90 days for workers and from 
90 to 120 days for managers (Clauwaert and Schömann 2013). Second, it 
made it easier for employers to use non-standard employment contracts 
by extending the maximum length of fixed-term employment contracts 
from 24 to 36 months and by relaxing the conditions for utilising 
temporary agency workers. Also, employers are allowed to unilaterally 
reduce the working week – and the corresponding wages – from five to 
four days. Furthermore, it made it possible for employers to grant free 
days in advance and to order employees to work overtime (Clauwaert and 
Schömann 2013). The period of time off as compensation for overtime 
has increased from three to four months. Finally, it reduced dismissal 
protection, particularly by diminishing protection for union leaders. The 
new provisions of the Labour Code make it easier for employers to hire 
and fire employees and to utilise flexible forms of employment contract. 
The austerity measures and the arbitrary way of pushing the reforms 
through without social dialogue led to a substantial decline in the 
popularity of the centre-right coalition in power between 2008 and 
2012 (Daborowski 2012). Although the government increased wages for 
public sector employees by 15 per cent in January 2011, the controversial 
privatisation of companies that extract natural resources and the attempt 
to privatise the health-care system led to growing social resistance and 
contributed to the collapse of the government in February 2012. A new 
government was put in place by the centre-right political coalition, but it 
collapsed after less than three months. 
In May 2012, a new centre-left coalition came to power. The centre-left 
government decided to take measures to enhance its social support, 
such as increasing wages in the public sector by 8 per cent from June 
2012 and by 7 per cent from December 2012 to restore public sector base 
wages to their 2008 level (Trif 2013). However, wage increases were not 
negotiated with the unions. Furthermore, the centre-left government had 
neither reversed the legal changes made by the previous government, 
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nor restored the other benefits (meal and holiday vouchers) and pay cuts 
for public sector employees (thirteenth month salary) by 2014 (Ministry 
of Finance 2014). The government also does not pay for overtime worked 
by public sector employees. For instance, the embargo on public sector 
employment and massive emigration of medical staff has led to staff 
shortages, which in turn requires nurses and doctors to work overtime in 
public hospitals to ensure patients’ well-being (Trif 2013). Furthermore, 
all the main changes in labour laws since 2008 have been introduced 
unilaterally by the centre-right and centre-left governments by means of 
emergency ordinances (without public or parliamentary debate), which 
indicates a return to authoritarian decision-making.
Trade union responses to the crisis: militancy against austerity measures
Trade unions opposed the austerity measures in 2009 and 2010, but 
they did not manage to resist the centre-right government’s attack on 
employees’ rights and the deterioration of employment conditions 
for public sector employees. Although the five union confederations 
consulted with the government on public sector pay reform, unions 
were dissatisfied with its provisions. They organised local meetings, 
marches and a one-day national strike of public transport employees 
in May 2009 against wage cuts, lay-offs and compulsory unpaid leave. 
Also, unions picketed two-thirds of the county prefectures in June 2009 
and threatened a general strike to force the government to consider their 
proposals with regard to the public wage law. These included a reduction 
of the existing ratio of 1:70 between the highest paid to the lowest paid 
to 1:15 by freezing wages for five years for high earners and accelerating 
increases for the lowest paid employees (Ciutacu 2010). Despite talks 
between government representatives and unions in June 2009 and 
further mass protests and picketing of the Parliament in September 
2009, the labour unrest has had no tangible result for employees. 
Furthermore, the reform of the public sector pay aggravated the divisions 
between union confederations and federations. The sectoral unions in 
education, health care and public administration were unhappy with 
the provisions of the new law and the fact that there was no scope for 
them to participate in negotiations with the government (Ciutacu 2010). 
Consequently, 11 union federations from the public sector formed a new 
organisation, the Alliance of Budgetary Employees. Their aim was to 
fight against austerity measures and modify the proposed reforms of 
public sector pay (Trif 2010). The Alliance organised a series of national 
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protests in 2009, culminating in a one-day general strike on 5 October 
2009. Around 750,000 public sector employees (out of a total of 1.35 
million public sector workers) were involved in the biggest strike since 
1990. The strike’s main goals were to renegotiate the public sector wage 
law, which reduced their incomes, to get the lay-off plans scrapped 
and to prevent changes to the Labour Code. Despite talks between the 
Alliance and government representatives, the strike failed to achieve its 
main goals and the wage law remained unchanged. As the government 
had the support of the EU and the IMF, this law was passed unilaterally 
without parliamentary debate or consideration of the key principles 
negotiated by the unions (no reduction of existing wages) in November 
2009 (Ciutacu 2010). This defeat made the centre-right government 
more confident that it could introduce further austerity measures.
In 2009, the five national union confederations set up a crisis committee 
to protest against the austerity measures. First, they asked the Romanian 
President to reject the austerity measures agreed by the Prime Minister 
with the Troika, but the President endorsed them. Second, the union 
confederations filed a complaint with the ILO in June 2010, claiming 
that the government was breaching union rights and freedoms. They 
also alerted EU bodies that the government was shifting the burden of 
the economic crisis onto employees and other vulnerable sections of the 
population (Trif 2010). Third, the unions identified over 400 measures 
to deal with the crisis. However, their proposals were largely ignored. 
As a result, unions withdrew from most tripartite bodies. Finally, the 
unions organised a series of protests against austerity measures in May 
2010, demanding that the government make no unilateral decisions on 
austerity measures, ensure implementation of collective agreements and 
eliminate restrictions on free collective bargaining from legislation. As 
unions did not get much support from the international bodies or the 
public (63 per cent of Romanians distrust unions, 15 per cent more than 
in 2007, according to Eurobarometer 2010), they did not manage to 
safeguard the employment conditions of their members and their own 
right to have meaningful involvement in collective bargaining and social 
dialogue. The failure of the protests against austerity measures in 2009 
and 2010 ultimately weakened the unions’ capacity to mobilise.
Furthermore, during the crisis, union officials suggested that there had 
been an organised campaign to intimidate and discredit the leaders of 
the five main confederations. The most notorious case was the arrest 
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of Marius Petcu in 2011 (the leader of the largest union confederation, 
CNSRL-Fratia), following an argument with President Basescu about the 
health-care budget, according to a senior union official. Nevertheless, 
many commentators have stated that certain union leaders are corrupt. 
Petcu was arrested for allegedly accepting a bribe from a businessman 
who was supposed to carry out construction work at a union centre 
(Barbuceanu 2012). The media reports about the alleged corruption of 
union leaders damaged their legitimacy and led to a decline in union 
membership (Trif 2013). The corruption allegations and unsuccessful 
strike action against the austerity measures greatly weakened trade 
union capacities to mobilise against the centre-right government’s attack 
on unions’ fundamental rights through legal changes in 2011.
Employers’ divergent responses to the crisis
In contrast to the unions, employers’ organisations did not have a unified 
response to the crisis and the labour law changes. In 2009 and 2010, the 
Council of Foreign Investors and the American Chamber of Commerce 
were involved in drafting the new labour laws and they were satisfied 
with the employment deregulation brought in by the new Labour Code 
and the Social Dialogue Act. In contrast, the four largest employers’ 
organisations (out of 13 confederations), covering almost two-thirds 
of the active labour force, joined the five trade union confederations in 
their protest against the Social Dialogue Act by withdrawing from the 
national tripartite institutions in September 2011 (Ciutacu 2012). It 
appears that the largest four employers’ confederations were against 
the Social Dialogue Act, primarily because its provisions brought to an 
end their main role as representatives of employers in national collective 
bargaining. Also, the national collective agreements maintained social 
peace and set minimum labour standards to ensure fair competition 
between their members. A senior official representing one of the largest 
employers’ associations considered that the suppression of national-
level collective bargaining and the new requirements for the extension of 
sectoral collective bargaining had a negative effect on the capacity of their 
members to deal with the economic crisis, while the increased flexibility 
of labour relations had a positive effect (Hayter et al. 2013: 48–49). 
Many employers appear to be happy with their boosted prerogative to 
set the terms of conditions of employment at the company level. 
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1.4  The impact of the crisis on collective bargaining
The substantive and procedural austerity measures introduced by the 
government with the support of the Troika during the recent crisis led 
to the dismantling of the multi-level collective bargaining system which 
operated in Romania before the crisis. The Social Dialogue Act makes it 
far more difficult to negotiate collective agreements at all levels due to 
the implosion of fundamental trade union rights (see Appendix). 
First, the Social Dialogue Act forbids collective bargaining across 
sectors. Before 2011, the five union confederations and their employers’ 
counterparts negotiated a single national collective agreement each year. 
This agreement stipulated minimum rights and obligations for the entire 
labour force in Romania. Only five (out of the 13) employers’ associations 
are still nationally representative, while all five union confederations 
maintain their representative status (Hayter et al. 2013). Nevertheless, 
four union confederations lost a considerable number of members 
(CNSRL-Fratia has 306,486 members compared with 850,000 in 2008; 
CNS Cartel Alfa has 301,785 compared with 1 million in 2008; BNS has 
254,527 compared with 375,000 in 2008), while membership of CSN 
Meridian has increased from 17,000 to 32,000 (Hayter et al. 2013: 13). 
Overall, the data suggest that trade union density has declined a great 
deal, from approximately 33 per cent in 2008, but there is no reliable 
information concerning trade union density or membership since the 
crisis (there is no information about CSDR membership) (Barbuceanu 
2014). Also, there are no recent data about employers’ organisation 
density, which in 2007 was 60 per cent (Barbuceanu 2014: 11). Since 2011, 
the four largest employers’ confederations (Employers’ Confederation 
of Romanian Industry - CONPIROM, Patronatul Roman, Uniunea 
Nationala a Patronatului Roman and UGIR-1903), together with the five 
union confederations have been militating for the modification of the 
Social Dialogue Act to allow them to negotiate cross-sectoral agreements 
and to have meaningful involvement in the tripartite bodies.
Second, the provisions of the Social Dialogue Act made it very difficult 
to negotiate collective agreements at sectoral level. Previously, the social 
partners that met the representativeness criteria could negotiate collective 
agreements that covered all employees and employers in a specific 
branch. In 2011, the social partners agreed to have 32 branches eligible 
for collective bargaining, out of which 20 had collective agreements (Trif 
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2013). The new law redefined 29 industrial sectors eligible for collective 
bargaining according to NACE activity codes. It requires the social 
partners to restructure and re-register with local courts and prove that 
they are representative of the redefined sectors. Trade union federations 
were keen to re-register to regain representativeness in this way (see 
Barbuceanu 2014: 13–15 for a list of union federations that reapplied 
to become representative, including those in manufacturing) to enable 
them to bargain collectively on behalf of their members. A total of 57 
union federations demanded the restoration of their representative 
status, while only seven employers’ federations had reapplied to become 
representative at the sectoral level by the end of 2012 (Hayter et al. 
2013: 56–59). There is a disincentive for employers’ associations to 
become representative, as the new sectoral agreements apply only to 
employers who are members of the employers’ organisations that signed 
the collective agreement, unless those organisations cover more than 
50 per cent of the labour force in the sector (see Appendix). As trade 
union federations had no counterparts to negotiate sectoral collective 
agreements in most sectors in 2012 and 2013, no new agreements were 
concluded in the private sector after 2011 (Barbuceanu 2014). Very few 
collective agreements were concluded for groups of hospitals or other 
public-sector sub-sectors, such as education, research and public water 
supply and sewage (Hayter et al. 2013). 
Third, the Social Dialogue Act makes it more difficult for trade unions 
to negotiate agreements at the company level, due to major procedural 
changes (see Appendix). Local unions had to re-register with local courts 
to be entitled to negotiate collective agreements. Many local unions lost 
their representative status as the new law stipulates that union density 
needs to be at least 51 per cent of the total labour force, compared with 
one-third under the previous law (if union density is lower or there 
is no union representation in a company, elected representatives of 
employees are allowed to negotiate collective agreements). Also, the new 
law requires a minimum of 15 workers from the same company to form 
a union, while previously 15 employees working in the same profession 
could form a union. The Social Dialogue Act makes it impossible for 
unions to bargain collectively in over 90 per cent of Romanian companies 
with fewer than 15 employees (Barbuceanu 2012). Not surprisingly, the 
number of collective agreements at company level has declined (Hayter 
et al. 2013: 23). 
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Finally, the Social Dialogue Act makes it more difficult for unions to 
take industrial action. Employees are no longer allowed to go on strike 
if the provisions of a collective agreement are not implemented by the 
employer. Also, it is obligatory for the parties in conflict to undertake 
conciliation before taking industrial action under the current law, which 
was not the case before 2011. During a strike, the workers involved lose 
all their employment rights, except their health-care insurance, while 
previously they lost only their wages. Furthermore, union officials were 
protected for two years after their mandate had expired under the old 
laws, while an employer can fire them immediately after their mandate 
expires under the provisions of the current Labour Code. Additionally, 
employees and their representatives are not allowed to organise 
industrial action if their demands require a legal solution to solve the 
conflict, which makes it almost impossible to organise protests against 
legal changes. By 2011, unions had a very weak capacity to mobilise 
against the centre-right government’s attack on fundamental trade 
union rights, following unsuccessful mass demonstrations and strike 
action against austerity measures in 2009 and 2010 and the corruption 
allegations concerning national union leaders.
Nevertheless, the union leaders of the five confederations signed a 
protocol in 2011 with the opposition. This promised to reverse the 
employment regulations introduced by the centre-right coalition in 
exchange for unions’ support for the 2012 elections. The centre-left 
coalition came to power in 2012, but the new government made virtually 
no legal changes to the Social Dialogue Act until March 2014. The ILO 
representatives held discussions with the centre-left government as well 
as representatives of the Troika about the need to amend the current 
labour laws to comply with ILO Conventions (Hayter et al. 2013). 
However, the EU and the IMF opposed most changes proposed by 
the social partners. While the Troika endorsed legal changes adopted 
unilaterally by the centre-right government (without parliamentary 
debate or consultation with unions and employers’ representatives) 
which reduced the protection of employees in 2011 (Trif 2013), in their 
joint comments, the EU and the IMF objected to the use of a slightly more 
democratic process to modify the Social Dialogue Act (Law 62/2011) to 
comply with the ILO Conventions: 
We understand that the present draft was prepared by trade union 
confederations that are representative at the national level and by 
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only four employer confederations. Given the importance of Law 
62/2011 for labor relations in Romania, which embodies a key 
reform, we think it is inappropriate to amend this law through an 
emergency ordinance and consider it of the utmost importance to 
go through the normal legislative process which ensures a thorough 
preparation and proper consultation of all social partners, including 
all employer organisations representative at the national level … 
we strongly urge the authorities to limit any amendments to Law 
62/2011 to revisions necessary to bring the law into compliance with 
core ILO Conventions. (European Commission and IMF 2012: 1)
The European Commission and the IMF opposed proposed changes 
concerning the extension of national and sectoral collective agreements. 
Specifically, they were against changes that would make it easier for 
employees to take industrial action and also asked for a further reduction 
in trade union influence by limiting the legal protection of local employee 
representatives involved in collective bargaining. However, they agreed 
with the proposed changes in the local union representativeness criteria 
from over 50 per cent to 35 per cent and a reduction of the number of 
members required to form a union from 15 to five. In contrast with the 
expectation that joining the EU would support workers’ rights (Kohl and 
Platzer 2004), the EU has played a crucial role in reducing employment 
rights and the capacity of trade unions to negotiate collective agreements 
during the recent crisis.
1.5  Concluding remarks 
The first section of this chapter examines the main changes in collective 
bargaining since 2008 based on secondary data. It argues that the 
centre-right governments had a primarily ideological motivation 
for dismantling the multi-level collective bargaining system in place 
prior to the 2008 crisis, with the support of the Troika. There was a 
need for structural reforms to redress economic imbalances, but the 
labour market regulations were not among the key factors requiring 
substantial modifications (Ban 2014). The centre-right governments 
offered a ‘technical’ justification to introduce certain structural reforms, 
particularly those required by the Troika to provide the promised 
loan (Stoiciu 2012). However, there was an ideological motivation 
for privatising public utilities, reducing social and welfare provisions 
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and diminishing the role and influence of trade unions in collective 
bargaining (Stoiciu 2012; Trif 2013).
Although both the austerity measures and the structural reforms have 
affected collective bargaining, labour law changes (associated with 
structural reforms) have led to a radical transformation of the industrial 
relations system and will damage collective bargaining mechanisms in 
the long run. The biggest change in collective bargaining is at the national 
level, with the Social Dialogue Act making it impossible for the social 
partners to negotiate cross-sectoral collective agreements. Moreover, 
the Act had made it very difficult to negotiate new sectoral agreements, 
due to the new legal requirements for the social partners. As a result, no 
new sectoral collective agreements were concluded in the private sector 
between 2012 and March 2014. There has also been a massive decline 
in the number of collective agreements at the company level since 2008 
(Hayter et al. 2013). Thus, the scope for the joint regulation of terms 
and conditions of employment has decreased significantly, while there 
has been an increase in employers’ (and managers’) prerogatives at the 
company level due to the erosion of collective and individual employees’ 
rights. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which employers are using these new 
prerogatives is unclear. Although national-level data indicate that labour 
costs as a proportion of GDP have declined since 2008 (Hayter et al. 
2013: 36), the available studies provide limited evidence concerning 
the outcomes of the collapse on national and sectoral-level collective 
bargaining for employees, particularly for those working in the 
manufacturing sector. Previous studies focus primarily on the impact 
of the austerity measures on the terms and conditions of public sector 
employees (Hayter et al. 2013; Trif 2013). No study was found to 
investigate the scope and the quality of the company-level agreements 
after the collapse of national and sectoral-level collective agreements. It 
could be expected that local unions in large manufacturing companies 
would be the most likely to maintain or improve the terms and conditions 
of employment of their members, as manufacturing sectors had the 
highest union density in the country. The second part of this chapter 
examines the actual impact of labour market reforms on collective 
bargaining in manufacturing and their implications for continuity and 
change in Romanian industrial relations, based on primary data. 
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2.  The impact of the reforms of joint regulation  
 and labour market policy on collective bargaining  
 in manufacturing
2.1  Introduction
The recent crisis led to different levels of change in industrial relations in 
the EU member states (Marginson 2015); Romania is an extreme case of 
disorganised decentralisation of collective bargaining. The deregulation 
of the labour market by the centre-right government with the support 
of the Troika has affected both the individual and collective rights of 
employees. 
The Labour Code amendments made it easier for employers to hire and 
fire employees and to use flexible working time arrangements, while 
the Social Dialogue Act (SDA), adopted in 2011, diminished employees’ 
fundamental rights to organise, strike and bargain collectively (Trif 
2013). This ‘frontal assault’ on multi-employer collective bargaining 
(Marginson 2015) led to a transformation of the regulatory framework 
from a statutory system that supported collective bargaining at the 
national, sectoral and company levels to a so-called ‘voluntary’ system 
(interview, state official, 2014). Nevertheless, the extent to which these 
legal changes have affected company-level collective bargaining is not 
known, particularly in the private sector.
This study investigates the impact of the labour market reforms on 
collective bargaining in the manufacturing sector, in which trade unions 
are relatively strong. It focuses on the effects of the labour law changes 
on collective bargaining in six companies operating in the metal and 
food sectors, where trade unions have managed to prolong the sectoral 
collective agreements negotiated before the adoption of the Social 
Dialogue Act until 2015. The selection of the six case studies aimed to 
cover a wide range of developments in collective bargaining. While in all 
six cases, the recent legal changes made collective bargaining far more 
difficult for trade unions, the degree of change in the terms and conditions 
of employment varied from radical changes in Food 4 (the worst case 
scenario) to a large degree of continuity in the Metal 5 case (the best case 
scenario), with the other cases being between these two extremes. The 
findings suggest that the degree of change and continuity in the terms 
and conditions of employment at company level is contingent on three 
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sets of inter-related factors: (i) the attitude of the employer (and senior 
management) towards employees and their representatives, (ii) the local 
labour market and (iii) the mobilisation capacity of the company trade 
union. 
2.2 Methodology
As this study seeks to examine the impact of labour market reforms 
on collective bargaining in manufacturing and their implications for 
continuity and change in Romanian industrial relations, it is based on 
in-depth interviews with 25 key informants at the national, sectoral 
and company levels. At the national level, two trade union officials, 
an employers’ association official and two government officials were 
interviewed. At the sectoral level, five trade union officials were 
interviewed, three from the metal sector and two from the food sector. 
Finally, 15 interviews were conducted in five metal companies and a food 
company; in four companies, both union officials and managers were 
interviewed, while in two metal companies only trade union officials 
were interviewed (see Table 1). 
The selection of the companies was based on recommendations by 
sectoral trade union officials, aiming to cover a wide range of companies 
in relation to the level of change and continuity in their terms and 
conditions of employment and collective bargaining developments since 
2008. All six companies are subsidiaries of multinational corporations; 
two of them have more than 1,000 employees (Metal 1 and Metal 5), two 
of them have between 500 and 1,000 employees, while the other two 
have between 200 and 500 employees (see Table 1). Apart from Food 4, 
employees are covered by a company collective agreement concluded by 
a representative union (which means that union density is over 50 per 
cent). 
The preliminary findings were presented at a one-day workshop attended 
by six trade union officials and an expert in Romanian industrial relations. 
The participants provided feedback on the preliminary findings, as well 
as additional information regarding the degree of change and continuity 
in Romanian industrial relations.
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2.3  Implications of the reforms for the process and character  
 of collective bargaining 
Frontal assault on national and sectoral collective bargaining 
Empirical findings indicated that the labour market reforms led to 
the destruction of national and sectoral collective bargaining. It was 
suggested that post-communist legacies rather than the crisis led to 
these reforms. According to state officials, the government had to change 
the statutory system that supported collective bargaining into a so-called 
‘voluntary’ system (interviews, 2014), due to ownership changes linked 
to the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. It was argued that most 
employment laws were passed before the mid-1990s, when the majority 
of companies were state-owned. In that context, the national trade unions 
managed to establish a regulatory framework in favour of employees 
and trade unions. Additionally, ‘there was a cascading increase in the 
obligations imposed on employers by collective agreements concluded 
at national, sectoral and company levels’ (interview, government official, 
2014). Consequently, the government sought to develop a ‘voluntary’ 
collective bargaining system by abolishing the legal obligations of the 
representative employers’ associations and trade unions to get involved 
in collective bargaining at cross-sectoral and sectoral levels. According 
to government officials, the main aim of the labour market reforms 
was to get collective bargaining at the company level to reflect the new 
economic and social circumstances of private companies.
Most respondents (except government officials) indicated that labour 
market reforms were initiated by the American Chamber of Commerce 
and other foreign investors in Romania. Respondents indicated that 
there was an informal government committee which consulted the 
representatives of foreign investors, while the government ignored the 
official channels of consultation with the trade unions and employers’ 
associations. Also, specific large multinational corporations, such as 
Arcelor Mittal Galati – which employs around 8,000 employees – 
influenced the provisions in the Social Dialogue Act. Following a two-
day strike in 2008 – workers asked for a 30 per cent pay increase but 
the strike was declared illegal by a local court – Arcelor Mittal made a 
complaint that the provision of the trade union law (Law 54/2003) that 
required employers to provide up to five days paid time off per month to 
local union officials for union activities is unconstitutional. This case was 
sent to the Constitutional Court, which upheld Arcelor Mittal’s claim. 
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This decision was incorporated into the new labour law (SDA). Thus, 
there is no longer a statutory requirement for employers to provide paid 
time off for union activities. 
Although all employers held the view that the former labour laws 
favoured employees and needed to be reformed to re-establish a balance 
of power between employers and employees, their views varied in terms 
of the degree of change needed. The employers’ associations official 
(representing one of the four employers’ confederations which was 
against the adoption of the Social Dialogue Act) argued that national and 
sectoral collective agreements were needed to ensure social peace, to avoid 
social dumping and to set the national minimum wage. Additionally, this 
respondent made reference to the broader consequences of unilateral 
decision-making by the government: 
In fact, Law 62 [SDA] has divided and significantly reduced the 
influence of both social partners, employers’ associations and trade 
unions. … This is very convenient for the government, as it allows it 
to impose any decisions very easily. (Employers’ association official 
2014)
In a similar vein, the CEO of Metal 3 indicated that multi-employer 
collective bargaining is needed to avoid social dumping and, more 
broadly, he considered that trade unions should have the right to bargain 
collectively at different levels. The view of this CEO is fairly exceptional, 
which seems to be linked to his extensive work experience in France. 
According to the employers’ association official, many members opted 
out of employers’ organisations (or threatened to opt out) in order to 
avoid the implementation of the provisions of multi-employer collective 
agreements. Findings suggest that the vast majority of employers and 
senior managers welcomed the labour law reforms that led to the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which labour law reforms damaged the 
employers’ associations was rather surprising; only five (out of 13) 
representative employers’ associations in 2010 were still representative 
in 2014. Furthermore, representative employers’ associations seem to 
have only a perfunctory role in bi- and tripartite institutions, as they 
are no longer involved in collective bargaining. The fact that employers’ 
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associations have a very limited role and influence at the national and 
sectoral levels seems to be the main reason for the refusal of other 
employers’ association officials to be interviewed or to participate in the 
workshop related to this project.
Similar to employers’ associations, the role and influence of the 
national and sectoral union organisations in collective bargaining has 
decreased considerably since the adoption of the SDA in 2011. The 
recommendations and the support of the Troika of the European Union, 
IMF and ECB for labour market deregulation made it almost impossible 
for the unions to defend against the destruction of the multi-employer 
collective bargaining institutions (Trif 2014). Nevertheless, union officials 
mentioned that the attack on employment rights and fundamental union 
rights did not lead to an increase in the internal cohesion and solidarity 
of the union movement. As statutory employment rights had been 
achieved primarily through national tripartite consultation in the 1990s, 
the national unions found it very difficult to mobilise workers and local 
unions, as they are not used to fighting for their legal rights.
Although national union confederations and federations have not been 
able to negotiate new collective agreements that cover all employees 
at national or sectoral levels since 2011, a number of sectoral unions 
negotiated multi-employer collective agreements. According to the data 
provided by a trade union confederation (CSDR), 24 multi-employer 
collective agreements were valid in 2014. Out of those, seven are 
labelled sectoral collective agreements but they cover solely employees 
in companies in which the employer is a member of the employers’ 
association that signed the collective agreement. The unions in the 
health care sector are seeking to extend the current multi-employer 
collective agreement to the entire health care sector using the provisions 
of the Social Dialogue Act. Although the quantitative requirements for 
extension are fulfilled in this sector – the employers who signed the 
collective agreement cover more than 50 per cent of the sectoral labour 
force – the new procedures for extending sectoral collective agreements 
are ambiguous and allow a minority of private employers to block 
extension. Union officials mentioned that this is a very important case (a 
rule-maker), as it is likely to be used as a reference for further requests 
to extend sectoral collective agreements.
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Out of the seven sectoral collective agreements2 three are in the private 
sector. All three are in manufacturing and were negotiated under the 
old labour laws (before 2011) and extended through additional acts 
until 2015. The collective agreement in the glass and ceramic products 
sector covers 39 companies. It provides a higher sectoral minimum 
wage (an additional 25 RON – 5.6 euros – to the national minimum 
wage per month). The collective agreement in the food, beverage and 
tobacco sector covers 770 companies, but it does not cover Food 4, as the 
employer is not a member of the employers’ association that negotiated 
this agreement. In contrast, Metal 5 case is covered by the collective 
agreement concluded for the electronics, electrical machinery and other 
equipment production sector, which applies to a total of 108 companies. 
Similar to most Romanian companies, the other four case studies are not 
covered by multi-employer collective agreements. 
Although the number of sectoral agreements has decreased a great deal 
since the recession,3 the number of collective agreements for groups 
of companies has increased from four in 2008 to 16 in 2013 (Table 2). 
A trade union official who participated in the negotiation of a multi-
employer collective agreement in the automotive industry indicated that 
there have been significant changes in the process of collective bargaining 
since 2008. In 2010, the two representative trade unions’ federations 
for the automotive sector negotiated (under the old legislation) an 
addendum to the sectoral collective agreement for 2011–2012 with the 
Employers Federation of the Machine-Building Industry (FEPA). Ford 
Craiova joined the FEPA in 2010 to lead these negotiations. 
Ford wanted to get a vague sectoral collective agreement to provide more 
scope for negotiations at the local level (that is, to get rid of wage scales, 
to decentralise the setting of working time, including lunch breaks 
and the payment for overtime and weekends at company level). Ford 
employed a consultancy law firm to negotiate the addendum on behalf 
of the FEPA. As this was the first time that the unions had to negotiate 
with a consultancy firm, union officials found the bargaining process 
very difficult. The lawyers based their negotiations on the minimum 
 
2. Similar to the agreements for a group of companies, the existing sectoral agreements 
cover only the members of the organisations that signed the agreement but the sectoral 
agreements have to be negotiated by representative trade unions and employers’ 
associations at the sectoral level. 
3. There was a decline from 20 sectoral collective agreements in 2010 to seven in 2013. 
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legal provisions of labour laws, as well as other laws covered by the 
Romanian Civil Code. It took four months to negotiate the addendum in 
2010, while the previous negotiations of the sectoral agreement took 30 
days. Although this addendum provided more flexibility for individual 
employers (to set overtime payments and pensions for workers who had 
work accidents at company level), a third of employers (148) opted out 
of FEPA in 2011, including Dacia Renault, which is the largest employer 
in the sector. Thus, employers that do not want to be covered by multi-
employer collective agreements opt out of the employers’ associations. 
In 2012, the two representative trade union federations negotiated 
another multi-employer collective agreement with the representatives of 
FEPA, to last for two years, which covers only 40 companies from the 
automotive sector, representing less than 10 per cent of the companies 
covered by the sectoral collective agreement in 2010. Although workers 
at Dacia Renault are no longer covered by a multi-employer agreement, 
they have the best employment terms and conditions in the sector, as 
the company continued to be profitable during the recession and it has 
a very strong local union (Interview, union federation official, 2014). All 
the respondents indicated that the company is the main level at which 
actual terms and conditions of employment are established. Although 
this was also the case before the crisis, the company-level negotiations 
used to start from the provisions negotiated at higher levels.
Table 2  Number of valid collective agreements between 2008 and 2013
Year Group of companies Company/workplace
2008 4 11 729
2009 9 10 569
2010 7 7 718
2011
8 (a new collective agreement plus seven additional articles 
to existing collective agreements)
8 317
2012 8 8 783
2013 16 8 726
Source: Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Protection (2014).
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Increasing the imbalance of power in favour of employers at company level
The number of company-level collective agreements has also declined, 
from 11,729 in 2008 to 8,726 in 2013 (Ministry of Labour, Family and 
Social Protection 2014). There was a major decline of approximately 
3,000 collective agreements between 2008 and 2010, while their number 
increased by around 1,000 in 2011 and 2012, again registering a slight 
decrease in 2013 (see Table 2). Overall the number of company-level 
agreements declined by 25 per cent between 2008 and 2013, while the 
biggest reduction took place before the adoption of the Social Dialogue 
Act in 2011. 
The legal reforms made the collective bargaining process more difficult 
at the company level, although in the five cases which had a collective 
agreement (except Food 4) local unions were representative under the 
Social Dialogue Act (union density was over 50 per cent of the total 
labour force). In these companies, local union officials indicated that 
they start negotiations from ‘zero’, while before 2011 they started the 
negotiations from the provisions agreed at the sectoral level. Better 
provisions were negotiated at the sectoral level regarding minimum 
wages, wage increases linked to inflation, payment of overtime, holiday 
entitlements and so on, while wage scales were negotiated at the national 
level. Two local officials revealed that they almost took for granted the 
provisions of the national and sectoral agreements, while they realised 
their importance when those agreements ceased to exist. 
According to the respondents, the main factor that affects the company 
collective bargaining process is the attitude of employers and senior 
management towards the local union. For instance, the senior managers 
have been fairly hostile towards trade unions since the 2000s at Metal 6, 
when the majority of the shares were bought by an investor. The relations 
between management and union were very good previously, when 
managers and employees owned the company (the company was initially 
privatised through the management and employee buy-out method in 
the 1990s). Immediately after the legal reforms, the management told 
unions that they were going to apply the new legal provisions. First, the 
company stopped collecting the union fees and encouraged supervisors 
and workers to leave the union. According to a union respondent, the 
senior management changed most of the middle managers (around 
60–70 per cent) and asked the new managers to use both the ‘carrot’ 
(‘bribe’ supervisors – the respondent indicated that he has seen lump 
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sums on their payroll) and the ‘stick’, by threatening to fire them. These 
tactics led to a decline in union membership by 25 per cent in a couple 
of months. Second, the senior management made it far more difficult for 
unions to communicate with their members, prohibiting union officials 
from discussing with members during their hours of work or posting 
any information regarding union activities in the company. Third, the 
management divided the company into seven independent undertakings 
and made it far more difficult for unions to get relevant information for 
bargaining purposes. The union had to re-register with the local court 
and prove that they were representative for each undertaking in order 
to be able to negotiate a collective agreement for each unit. Overall, the 
process of collective bargaining has become more adversarial and more 
difficult for unions in the case of Metal 6 since the legal reforms. 
In the other four case studies from the metal industry, the attitude of 
employers and senior managers towards unions was fairly cooperative. 
In Metal 1, the HR manager indicated that the company preferred not 
to take advantage of the new provisions of the legislation regarding 
collective bargaining, as the ‘labour laws might change again’ (interview, 
2014). Nevertheless, the collective bargaining process has become far 
more difficult, as the union finds it difficult to organise and represent 
half of the labour force which is on fixed-term contracts. The company 
used the new provisions of the Labour Code, which makes it easier for 
employers to employ workers on fixed-term contracts and virtually all 
new employees were hired on this basis after 2011. In a similar vein, in 
Metal 3, the union has very good relations with senior management and 
their relationship has not changed since 2011. However, the union was 
unable to defend against the reduction of the labour force by 40 per cent 
due to the new provisions of the Labour Code, which makes it easier to 
hire and fire employees. 
Similar developments took place in the case of Metal 2. The union has 
good relations with the current senior management team and there 
have been no changes in the process of collective bargaining, but the 
management reduced the working week from five to four days during 
the summer months, as permitted by the new provisions of the Labour 
Code. Somewhat surprisingly, the union official mentioned that the 
collective bargaining process was far more difficult before 2008, when 
there was a different main shareholder of the company, who was not 
very keen to negotiate with the union. In a context of decentralisation of 
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collective bargaining and legal reforms that provide more prerogatives 
to employers to decide the terms and conditions of employment, it is not 
surprising that the power of individual employers and senior managers, 
even in companies in which trade unions managed to negotiate collective 
agreements.
The large degree of continuity in the bargaining process in four (out of 
the five) case studies in which unions are relatively strong, as well as 
in the case of Dacia Pitesti (which has the strongest company union4 in 
Romania, according to national union officials), indicate that individual 
employers did not really need the new labour laws to redress the power 
balance in their favour. As these cases are among a minority of companies 
in which union density is over 50 per cent, the empirical findings support 
the unions’ view that the legal reforms have further tilted the balance of 
power in favour of employers. According to a senior union official
the previous legal framework ensured a degree of equilibrium of 
power between the two parties [trade unions and employers]; the 
new laws are solely about the needs of employers. Trade unions 
do not count, even if they have 100 per cent union density. (Union 
confederation official, 2014)
In the next section we examine the impact of the reforms on the terms 
and conditions of employment. 
2.4  Implications of the reforms for the content and outcome  
 of collective bargaining at sectoral and company level, on  
 wages and working time in particular
Impact of the reforms on workers
Although the legal reforms substantially reduced joint regulation of the 
terms and conditions of employment by the social partners,5 there are 
still three sectoral collective agreements in the manufacturing sector. As 
these agreements were negotiated before the major changes in the labour 
4. It refer to a trade union representing workers in a specific company, site or undertaking 
(not a yellow union).
5. Until 2010, all legally employed workers were covered by the multi-employer collective 
agreements at the national level and many of them were also covered by sectoral agreements, 
while currently all employees working in companies with fewer than 20 employees are no 
longer covered by any joint regulations.
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laws in 2011, there have been no marked alterations in their content and 
outcome. In the food, drinks and tobacco industry, the latest sectoral 
negotiations took place in 2010, when the 2006 collective agreement 
was prolonged until 2015 by means of an addendum. This addendum 
changed only an article in the sectoral agreement, increasing the sectoral 
minimum wage to 650 RON. The national minimum wage was increased 
to 670 RON in 2011 and thus the sectoral minimum wage has become 
the same as the national minimum wage, while in the previous sectoral 
agreement it was 20 per cent higher. A union official considered that 
they were rather lucky that they managed to prolong the 2006 sectoral 
agreement (which expired in 2010) before the legal reforms of 2011. 
Different from the automotive sector, where a collective agreement 
was negotiated after the legal changes in 2011,6 there were no changes 
regarding wage scales, payment of overtime and working time in the 
sectoral collective agreement in the food, drinks and tobacco industry.
The biggest change in the outcome of current sectoral agreements is the 
fact that they cover only employers that are members of the employers’ 
association that signed them. According to the union officials interviewed, 
the new legislation is unclear regarding the extension mechanism for the 
agreements signed before the adoption of the Social Dialogue Act. Trade 
unions argued that those collective agreements should cover all companies 
in the sector. In 2012, the representative union federations from the food 
industry took this claim to the relevant court and got a decision in their 
favour, but this decision has been contested by government officials. They 
indicate that sectoral agreements should cover only those employers that 
signed the agreement, in accordance with the new labour legislation. 
Despite having a valid sectoral collective agreement in the food, 
drinks and tobacco industry, local unions affiliated to a representative 
federation (which negotiated the sectoral agreement) are unable to use it 
as a starting point for local negotiations if the employer is not part of the 
employers’ association. In practice, it appears that all sectoral agreements 
are implemented according to the provisions of the Social Dialogue Act, 
as indicated by the case of the Food 4 company.
Unilateral management decision-making is well illustrated by the worst 
case scenario for employees found in the Food 4 case. This company, 
which has approximately 900 employees, is one of the leaders in the 
Romanian milling and bread manufacturing market. It was privatised 
6. The automotive sector is no longer covered by a sectoral collective agreement. 
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in the late 1990s, bought by a Greek family business. The company had 
a strong company trade union before privatisation (interview, sectoral 
union official, 2014). In the early 2000s, when the company moved 
its main location to the outskirts of the city, the employer decided to 
improve the terms and conditions of employment unilaterally and 
encouraged workers to leave the union. In these circumstances, the 
company union was dissolved. Respondents indicated that the Greek 
employer and senior management team had a paternalistic approach to 
managing people, offering good wages and individual financial support 
to their workers (personal loans and financial help if somebody was sick 
in the family). Hence, employees were reasonably happy with their terms 
and conditions of employment. 
The change of ownership led to major changes in management style. 
During the recent crisis, the Greek company sold its shares to an Austrian 
holding company, which obtained over 95 per cent of the Food 4 company 
shares in 2013. Respondents suggested that the holding group wished to 
restructure the company very quickly and sell it on after a couple of years. 
In order to do so, the new owner decided to change all the managers (a 
similar tactic to that used in Metal 4). The company initially employed 
a new senior management team on fixed-term contracts to make sure 
that the employer had control over them. Their first task was to replace 
virtually all middle managers. The management employed a new cohort 
of middle managers, initially by getting two managers for each middle/
line manager position and then gradually firing the managers employed 
before 2013. According to a former HR manager, they initially fired the 
most vulnerable managers, such as single mothers, parents with small 
children and workers who had less than two years before they retired. 
The fired managers got a month’s notice but they were prohibited from 
coming to work or visit their workplace during the notice period, which 
made it very difficult for those managers to talk to each other. The 
company provided the minimum redundancy compensation specified 
by law, not the seven months’ wages indicated in the sectoral collective 
agreement. In this context, some line managers contacted a former HR 
director to ask for her advice. 
A recently fired middle manager tried to bring in the former HR manager 
to help him negotiate with the new management to keep his job and/or 
get a better redundancy package but he was told in a very hostile manner 
‘if you don’t like it, you can sue the company’ (interview, 2014). The 
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respondents indicated that the employment climate in the company is 
very poor and most managers and workers are afraid that they will lose 
their jobs. The respondents did not know how many managers or non-
managerial employees have already been fired. A middle manager, with 
the help of the union federation and the former HR director, approached 
other middle managers that had been fired and set up a company union 
to try to defend their rights. This new union had just registered with the 
relevant court when the interviews took place in 2014. The new union 
has asked the representative union federation in the sector to represent 
it for the purpose of collective bargaining at the company level, which 
is allowed under the provisions of the Social Dialogue Act. This was an 
extreme case of a non-unionised company in which a change of employer 
led to the alteration of the management’s attitude towards employees, 
from a paternalistic management style to an autocratic one. These 
changes particularly affected job security and the employment climate. 
In all case studies, respondents indicated that the attitude of the 
employer and local senior management team to employees and unions 
had the most important effect on the degree of change in the terms 
and conditions of employment. In Metal 6, the hostile attitude towards 
unions led to an increase in the number of conflicts, which were taken 
by the union to the relevant courts for resolution. In the other cases, 
the managers primarily used the new provisions of the Labour Code, 
which allow employers to make more flexible employment contracts 
and working time arrangements. In the case of Metal 1, the management 
changed full-time contracts to fixed-term employment contracts for 
half the labour force; in Metal 2, the management reduced the working 
week from five to four days when demand declined during the summer; 
finally, the management of Metal 5 reduced its labour force by 40 per 
cent, due to a reduction in demand. Overall, respondents indicated that 
managers use the flexible working time arrangements provided by the 
reformed laws to deal with the fluctuation in demand for their products.
The respondents also indicated that the influence of employers and senior 
management teams in setting wages has increased due to the major 
reduction of the coverage of multi-employer collective agreements, as 
well as specific legal reforms. The new Labour Code specifies that it is the 
management’s prerogative to decide the targets for specific job categories 
unilaterally; previously, managers were obliged to negotiate those targets 
with unions. This prerogative makes it fairly easy for managers to increase 
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employees’ workloads by raising the targets for specific jobs, without 
pay increases. In sectors in which there are multi-employer collective 
agreements, if employers are not willing to implement the relevant 
provisions, they can opt out of the employers’ association. Previously, 
all employers in the sector had to implement collective agreements 
concluded at higher levels by representative social partners. 
Also, the influence of local senior management over pay has increased, 
as in most companies they do not have to consider the provisions 
negotiated at the higher levels. For instance, in the case of Metal 1, 
an increase in wages in line with inflation applied automatically to all 
companies covered by the sectoral agreement until 2011; now, however, 
inflation is included in the percentage of wage increases negotiated at 
the company level. The wages for newly employed low-skilled employees 
were above the minimum wage before 2011, but currently they get only 
the minimum wage. All respondents indicated that the influence of 
employers and senior managers on determining wages has increased 
greatly since the recent legal reforms.
In addition, the decentralisation of collective bargaining has led to an 
increase in local benchmarking. Union officials (and other respondents) 
indicated that the local labour market and wage levels in similar companies 
in the area represented the main reference for wage bargaining. In the 
case of Metal 1, the union benchmarked their wages against those of Metal 
2, which has the highest wages in the region. Union respondents at Metal 
1 indicated that wages are currently higher in another factory, which is 
located in the same area as Dacia Renault, which has the highest wages 
in the manufacturing sector. As local benchmarking has become more 
important since the collapse of national and sectoral agreements, the 
unions from Metal 1 and Metal 2 decided to withdraw their affiliations with 
two different national federations and created a regional union federation 
to enable them to coordinate their local collective bargaining. Thus, the 
importance of wage developments in the local market has increased since 
the recession, while there have been no changes regarding the influence 
of firms’ economic performance, labour productivity and the quality of 
goods produced on setting wages.
Finally, findings suggest that the ability of local unions to increase wages 
and defend against the deterioration of other terms and conditions of 
employment is contingent on their capacity to mobilise members to take 
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industrial action. The best-case scenario was found at Dacia Renault 
Pitesti, where workers’ terms and conditions of employment have not 
deteriorated since the recession. Apart from having one of the largest 
company unions in terms of membership (over 13,000 members), the 
union at Dacia Renault Pitesti managed to increase the annual wage by 
350 RON (80 euros), following a 16-day strike in 2008. In a similar vein, 
in the cases of Metal 5 and Metal 1, union officials indicated that the 
fact that they have proven to management that members are willing to 
go on strike to support the union’s position during collective bargaining 
enabled them to increase wages after the 2011 labour reforms. In 
contrast, a union official indicated that his organisation has very limited 
influence during the collective bargaining process because the union 
is unable to mobilise workers who are worried about job insecurity, 
despite the fact that virtually all workers are union members (workshop 
discussion, 2014). 
Summing up, in a context of disorganised decentralisation of collective 
bargaining, the case studies illustrate great variation concerning the 
impact of reforms on the terms and conditions of employment. The 
degree of change in such terms and conditions for employees varied from 
radical changes in Food 4 and Metal 6 to a large degree of continuity in 
Metal 5, with the other cases lying between those two extremes (Table 
2). In the companies in which demand decreased since the recession, 
employers used the new provisions of the Labour Code to impose more 
flexible working time and atypical employment contracts (Metal 1, Metal 
2 and Metal 3). While working time arrangements have been changed 
unilaterally by employers, wages and other terms and conditions of 
employment have been negotiated via collective bargaining in five cases 
which have representative unions. The ability of unions to maintain or 
improve the terms and conditions of employment through collective 
bargaining has been affected by three main interrelated factors, namely 
(i) the attitude of the employer and senior management to employees 
and their representatives, (ii) the local labour market and developments 
in collective bargaining in other large companies in a specific area and 
(iii) the union strength and the history of the relations between the local 
unions and management.
Implications of the reforms for the social partners 
As the main purpose of the labour market reforms was to give more power 
to individual employers to set the terms and conditions of employment, 
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it is not surprising that the reforms have led to a reduction in the role and 
influence of trade unions and employers’ associations. All respondents 
indicated that the national confederations and many federations have 
lost their main role in collective bargaining. Additionally, their role in the 
tripartite and/or bipartite bodies has been reduced substantially, while 
the government’s role in industrial relations has increased. According to 
an employers’ association official:
Law 62 [SDA] has fragmented unions and employers’ associations in 
Romania and reduced their power. It is clear that having weak social 
partners is convenient for the Romanian government; without strong 
social partners, the government can easily impose its decisions. 
(Interview, 2014)
Representatives of both employers’ associations and unions revealed 
that there is very limited dialogue between the social partners and the 
government. While prior to 2011 the minimum wage was negotiated by 
the social partners, currently it is decided unilaterally by the government. 
Also, a new National Tripartite Council was established under the 
provisions of the Social Dialogue Act, but it has largely a decorative function 
(interview, 2014). Apart from the fact that its administrative procedures 
are unclear, it currently comprises 30 government representatives, six 
employers’ representatives and five union representatives, which makes 
it very easy for the government representatives to impose their views on 
any matter. Thus, state intervention in industrial relations has increased. 
Furthermore, since 2011 the state has supported employers’ prerogative to 
set the terms and conditions of employment at company level, in contrast 
to its role prior 2010, when it primarily supported workers’ rights. 
The decentralisation of collective bargaining has led to the disorganisation 
of employers’ associations. Only five (out of 13) employers’ organisations 
are still representative at the national level. In a context of favourable 
regulations, employers do not need to be members of employers’ 
organisations. By and large, individual employers are content with the 
provisions of the new Labour Code and the Social Dialogue Act. They 
have used the new provisions of the Labour Code, which allow more 
flexibility, to deal with fluctuations in demand for their products (Metal 1, 
Metal 2 and Metal 3). Most employers prefer to set terms and conditions 
at the company level, sometimes with the help of consultancy law firms. 
As a result, many employers opted out of employers’ associations. 
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Furthermore, union officials revealed that employers often select 
representatives for multi-employer bargaining and/or bi- and tripartite 
institutions that do not have a mandate to take any decisions. 
The Social Dialogue Act enhanced the influence not only of individual 
employers but also of local unions in relation to other echelons in the 
union movement. The tensions between the company-level unions and 
(con)federations have increased a great deal since 2011. As confederations 
and many federations are no longer negotiating collective agreements, 
the company unions (which collect the membership fees) are contesting 
the distribution of membership fees. Local unions have started to retain 
a higher percentage of the membership fees, which has led to financial 
difficulties for some federations and confederations. Also, it was revealed 
by respondents that some local unions report a lower number of members 
to reduce the amount of fees paid to federations and confederations. 
According to national union officials, in many highly unionised large 
companies, local union officials use their position to obtain personal 
benefits: 
The large majority of local leaders (not all of them) act like they 
are owners of the company unions. Very few of them consult their 
members and involve them in the decisions taken. With these 
‘ownership rights’ over the union organisation, union leaders use 
their position to get involved in local politics, make money and 
to acquire high power status in the local community. (Interview, 
national union confederation, 2014)
This behaviour leads to a vicious circle; if federations and confederations 
try to do something about it, the local unions threaten withdrawal from 
federations and confederations, and the (con)federations lose their 
financial resources and their representative status.
Additionally, legal reforms and declining resources due to falling 
membership for many unions have led to tensions between federations 
and confederations. While confederations cooperated to fight austerity 
measures and the legal reforms in the first years of the recession (Trif 
2014), there seems to have been less cooperation since the adoption 
of the legal reforms in 2011. For instance, it was revealed that the BNS 
initiative to change the new Labour Code had rather limited support 
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from the other union confederations. Although the Social Dialogue Act is 
a threat to the union movement in Romania, it has resulted in divisions 
within and among organisations rather than solidarity.
Nevertheless, some union federations have acquired a more active role 
in local bargaining since 2011, although their role and influence depend 
on the willingness of local unions to involve them. While the status of 
local unions within union hierarchies has been enhanced, their influence 
vis-à-vis employers has declined. In companies in which unions have 
more than 50 per cent density, local unions negotiate the collective 
agreements from a weaker position (lower legal labour standards, 
less legal protection for union officials, more difficulties in striking, 
reduction of union membership, such as in the cases of Metal 1 and 
Metal 6). In companies in which unions are no longer representative, 
the local unions need to cooperate with the ‘elected’ representatives of 
employees during the bargaining process. As employees’ representatives 
are generally selected by the management team and have no collective 
bargaining experience, according to respondents, they often undermine 
unions during the negotiation process (interviews, 2014). Nevertheless, 
collective bargaining is still possible in unionised companies, particularly 
if the local union is affiliated to a representative federation, which can 
negotiate (if asked) on their behalf. 
In contrast, companies with fewer than 20 employees (and the majority 
of larger non-unionised companies) are no longer covered by any joint 
regulations, and this has boosted the grey labour market. The number of 
workers without an employment contract or paid the national minimum 
wage plus cash in hand has increased due to the lack of national and 
sectoral agreements,7 particularly in small enterprises. This has negative 
consequences for all parties: for the state, it reduces the financial 
contributions of workers and employers to the budget; for employers, 
there is unfair competition from those who avoid paying payroll taxes; 
for unions, it reduces their capacity to organise vulnerable workers 
and makes it more difficult to improve wages for legally employed 
workers. The state officials indicated that the government has increased 
the number of labour inspectors and fines for illegal work, but they 
recognised that the new legal provisions have not yet managed to tackle 
this issue. According to some respondents, there are not enough labour 
inspectors and some of them are corrupt. 
7. Reliable data are not available on changes in the grey/black labour market since the recession.
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Representatives of both employers’ associations and unions have fairly 
negative views of state intervention in industrial relations. They consider 
that Romania was used as a ‘guinea pig’ by foreign investors with the 
support of the IMF and the European Union to radically decentralise 
collective bargaining. According to a union official,
The Romanian government has been very weak. Romania is a case 
study, a ‘guinea pig’. All the labour market reforms were initiated and 
adopted at the recommendation of two players; one is the American 
Chamber of Commerce and the other is the Foreign Investors Council. 
The Romanian model has been exported to other central and eastern 
European countries and foreign investors wish to extend it in western 
European countries. (Interview, union confederation official, 2014)
Romania is perceived by unions and Romanian employers to be a ‘rule-
maker’ in terms of the decentralisation of collective bargaining in the EU. 
Summing up, the labour market reforms led to three interrelated conse-
quences for the social partners: (i) it resulted in a considerable decline 
in the role and influence of the union movement and employers’ associa-
tions, while the influence of individual employers and the state in setting 
the terms and conditions of employment has increased; (ii) although the 
legal reforms threaten the existence of the employers’ associations and 
unions, they led to divisions within both unions and employers’ organi-
sations rather than solidarity; and (iii) the reduction of joint regulation 
and the decentralisation of collective bargaining made it easier for em-
ployers not to implement labour laws and the provisions of collective 
agreements (Food 4), which led to an increase in the grey labour market. 
2.5  Discussion and conclusion: general trends regarding  
 change and continuity in industrial relations 
This chapter examines the impact of labour market reforms on 
collective bargaining in strongly unionised manufacturing sectors, 
highlighting the main implications in terms of continuity and change 
in Romanian industrial relations. The empirical findings suggest that 
the legal reforms have led to a radical decentralisation of the Romanian 
industrial relations system, as the national confederations and many 
sectoral unions’ and employers’ organisations lost their main raison 
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d’être, namely to negotiate collective agreements. Although there are 
multi-employer collective agreements in the metal and food sectors, 
the empirical findings indicate a decentralisation and fragmentation of 
collective bargaining, even in these strongly unionised sectors.
The degree of change and continuity in the terms and conditions of em-
ployment at company level is contingent on three sets of inter-related 
factors: 
(i)  The attitude of the employer (and senior management) to employ-
ees and their representatives; the attitude of the employer varied 
from fairly cooperative in Metal 5, Metal 2 and Metal 3, to hostile 
in Food 4 and Metal 6. Although this is not surprising, given the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, it is interesting that some 
union respondents perceived that the attitude of the employer/sen-
ior management to employees affected developments in company 
collective bargaining more than the recent legal changes.
(ii) It was somewhat unexpected that union officials, as well as managers 
interviewed, considered that the local labour market and develop-
ments in collective bargaining in other large companies in a specific 
area affect the provisions of collective agreements more than the 
strength of the company trade union (in terms of union member-
ship, density and mobilisation capacity). In all five companies that 
had a collective agreement, both unions and managers considered 
that the outcomes of collective bargaining in other companies in the 
area affected the process and the outcomes of collective bargaining 
in their company; Metal 6 was considered by a union official to be 
a ‘rule maker’, in the sense that it was the first company in the area 
where the senior management implemented the new provisions of 
the Social Dialogue Act, despite having a fairly strong trade union.
(iii)  Finally, union strength and the history of relations between local un-
ions and management have affected company collective bargaining, 
particularly in Metal 5 and Metal 1, where the unions have proven 
their capacity to mobilise their members in the past five years; also, 
the worst deterioration of the terms and conditions of employment 
was in Food 4, which was not unionised; the hostile attitude of the 
senior managers towards middle managers and employees in Food 
4 led to the creation of a new trade union. 
The survival of collective bargaining in the manufacturing sector in Romania
 Joint regulation and labour market policy in Europe during the crisis 433
The reforms have led to a great increase in the influence of individual 
employers in setting the terms and conditions of employment, while 
the role and influence of national and sectoral unions and employers’ 
organisations has decreased a great deal. While the reduction of 
the influence of unions’ and employers’ associations in industrial 
relations was expected, the extent of the decline and divisions within 
these organisations was surprising; many national level organisations, 
particularly employers’ associations, appear to be on the verge of 
collapse, as they no longer have a role in collective bargaining and their 
role in tripartite institutions is minimal (if any). In this context, it could 
be expected that these organisations would seek solutions to survive. 
One of the five union confederations, BNS, used this crisis as an oppor-
tunity to restructure itself and change its main role from collective bar-
gaining to providing individual services for its members. The union did a 
survey of all its members to find out their current and future needs. Pri-
marily based on the information collected through this survey, the un-
ion created an electronic platform which focuses on providing individual 
services, ranging from support in finding jobs and career progression, 
to health and safety regulations and support with individual negotia-
tions and grievances. This system was established well before 2008 but 
it could not be implemented before the crisis due to resistance from lo-
cal union leaders. The new system provides transparency regarding the 
activities of local unions and to some extent reduces the power of local 
union leaders, as it makes it easier for members to get access to services 
provided by union federations and confederations. Also, the platform 
makes it easier for members to communicate with union federations or 
confederations. Last but not least, it makes it easier for members to ob-
tain union support when they change jobs, even if they decide to work 
abroad. Nevertheless, the new system was operating only on a pilot basis 
when the research was conducted in 2014. Therefore, it is not yet pos-
sible to assess its effectiveness. 
Most respondents revealed that they want the state to ‘rescue’ and 
revive industrial relations institutions through labour law changes but 
this seems unlikely in the near future. None of the respondents were 
optimistic that the current centre-left government would provide 
more statutory support for employee and union rights. The view of 
the state officials interviewed was that Romania needs a decentralised 
‘voluntary’ system, in which individual employers negotiate with unions 
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or representatives of workers at the company level. They indicated that 
the government would consider legal changes only if the employers 
and unions reach an agreement on specific modifications. As individual 
employers are happy with the current legal framework, it is unlikely that 
this will happen in the near future. Union officials mentioned that in 
some companies there have been unorganised protests by discontented 
workers in the past couple of years. If this trend continues, employers 
may wish to change the legal framework to ensure social peace.
The Romanian government changed the regulatory framework from a 
statutory system that supported collective bargaining at the national, 
sectoral and company levels to a so-called ‘voluntary’ system, which 
made it almost impossible to negotiate new national and sectoral 
collective agreements between 2011 to 2014. State officials argued that 
the main reason for those changes was the privatisation of companies, 
not necessarily the recent crisis. Findings indicate that ownership 
changes had a key role in triggering the transformation of the industrial 
system in Romania. Although these changes appear to be linked to the 
post-socialist legacies of the privatisation of the state-owned companies, 
representatives of both unions’ and employers’ organisations argued that 
the new legal framework was initiated by foreign investors. Moreover, a 
national union leader suggested that ‘the actual text of the labour laws 
was given to Boc’s government by foreign investors and transposed 
verbatim into legislation’ (interview, 2014). Thus, the deregulation of 
the Romanian labour market seems to be better explained by the rise of 
neoliberal policies and globalisation.
Similar to other southern European countries, especially Greece, the 
Romanian labour laws that supported collective bargaining have been 
changed radically since 2008, which has led to a rapid demolition of 
the collective bargaining institutions at national and sectoral levels 
(Koukiadaki and Kokkinou 2016; Marginson 2015). These changes 
have empowered employers to reduce employment rights and have 
weakened the influence of trade unions in many unionised companies. 
These developments in collective bargaining and industrial relations 
support the view that statutory labour laws are not sufficient to uphold 
employment rights (Hyman 2014). 
In contrast to Bohle and Greskovits’ (2012) argument that Romania 
has a weak state that concedes to union demands, the recent changes 
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in collective bargaining point instead to a relatively strong state (due to 
the external support of the Troika) and weak unions. The government’s 
disregard for the provisions of collective agreements, the legislative 
changes and the alleged intimidation of union leaders have led to a 
decline of union legitimacy and influence in collective bargaining. The 
recession was used as a pretext by the centre-right government to reform 
the industrial relations system. The Social Dialogue Act was passed 
unilaterally by the government without being debated in Parliament 
and without involving the social partners. Also, the government made 
statutory changes to the terms and conditions of employment agreed 
by the social partners. The non-democratic procedures used to alter 
industrial relations resemble the authoritarian rule before 1989. 
Evidence points to a large degree of continuity in terms of strong state 
intervention in industrial relations. This institutional arrangement 
seems to be a type of authoritarian neoliberalism (Trif 2013), as changes 
in industrial relations are driven by an interventionist state in the field 
of wage setting that, at the same time, is pushing forward labour market 
deregulation and dismantling workers’ rights. Similar to other countries 
severely affected by the crisis, the Romanian government has managed 
to introduce these neoliberal policies with the strong support of the 
Troika.
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Appendix
Key changes in fundamental unions’ rights after the adoption of the Social 
Dialogue Act (SDA)
Before SDA
(until 2011)
Key changes after the adoption of SDA
(since 2011)
C
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ba
rg
ai
ni
ng
N
at
io
na
l l
ev
el Unions negotiated annual 
national collective agreements 
at cross-sectoral level, which 
covered all employees.
Unions are not allowed to negotiate cross-sectoral 
collective agreements.
Se
ct
or
al
 le
ve
l
20 sectors (out of 32) 
were covered by collective 
agreements in 2011.
There was statutory extension 
of collective agreements.
Unions unable to negotiate new sectoral collective 
agreements in the private sector until March 2014.
Collective agreements can be extended only if the 
members of employers’ associations that signed the 
agreement employ more than 50 per cent of the labour 
force in the sector.
Co
m
pa
ny
 le
ve
l
Unions were considered 
representative if their density 
was ≥ 33 per cent.
Shop stewards could take up 
to five days of paid leave to 
deal with union issues.
Unions are representative if their density is ≥51 per cent.
=> Unions with less than 51 per cent density are not 
eligible to conclude collective agreements on their own
Shop stewards can take up to five days of unpaid leave 
to deal with union issues.
Fr
ee
do
m
 o
f 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
Minimum of 15 employees 
working in the same 
profession could form a union.
Minimum of 15 workers from the same company is 
required to form a union.
=> Unions cannot organise workers in over 90 per cent 
of Romanian companies, which have fewer than 15 
employees (Barbuceanu 2012).
In
du
st
ri
al
 a
ct
io
n
No obligatory conciliation 
before strikes.
Unions were allowed to 
organise industrial action to 
enforce the implementation of 
collective agreements. 
Obligatory conciliation before strike action. 
Workers are not allowed to go on strike if collective 
agreement provisions are not implemented.
The solution to conflicts requires legal changes.
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